Mutiny! Recommendations: Part IV of the Opinions of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee on the Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies Aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation

Part I: “Remember the Kitty Hawk! Remember the Constellation! West Point’s Female Black Supremacists are Continuing a Grand U.S. Military Civil Rights Tradition!
“Mutiny! Two Racist Mutinies the U.S. Navy Has “Disappeared,” and the Shadow Navy Command Structure”;

Part II: “The Congressional Report on the Racist, Black Mutinies in 1972 aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation: Findings”;

Part III: “The Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation: Opinions of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee”;

Part V: “The Mutiny on the Kitty Hawk: ‘Kill the son-of-a-bitch! Kill the white trash! Kill, kill, kill!’ The Report of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee on the Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation”;

Part VI: “The Mutiny on the Constellation”;

Part VII: “Permissiveness and Appeasement”;

Part VIII: “When the U.S. Navy Blinked”;

Part IX: “A Navy of Saboteurs”;

Part X: “Black Supremacism in Uniform”;

Part XI: “ The Shadow Navy: White Surrender, and the Black Supremacist Takeover”; and

Part XII: “Integrating Unfit Racists into This Man's Navy.”

Re-posted by Nicholas Stix

Note that neither the U.S. Navy nor the House Congressional Sub-Committee found that black supremacist sailors aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation had mutinied, but if those insurrections weren’t mutinies, then nothing is.

I suspect that the Navy and Congress will never admit to blacks mutinying, but if they ever call an act “mutiny,” it will be the act of one or more normal white men.


C. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. While there has been no doubt as to the overall combat effectiveness of the Navy in Southeast Asia, challenges to the maintenance of good order and discipline arising during noncombat periods cause concern for the continued total effectiveness of the service. To obviate this concern, naval leadership, the chain of command and harmonious interpersonal relationships must be strengthen. Specifically, the subcommittee recommends that formal leadership training programs be expanded and emphasized for all personnel in the middle management positions.

2. The subcommittee recommends that if similar incidents arise on the other ships, the crew be called to general quarter. Such a tactic, as demonstrated by U.S.S. Saratoga, is effective in breaking up unauthorized groups and preventing shipwide rampages by placing the ship and crew in their most secure condition. Further, it provides the commanding officer with the time he needs for contemplation of his options.

3. We cannot emphasize too strongly that recruiting advertisements and literature and the promises made by recruiters should be, in all respects, absolutely accurate and objective. There is danger in overselling.

4. Policy regarding unauthorized meetings is fully covered by existing naval and ship's regulations. These should be consistently enforced.

5. The subcommittee recommends that recruit training be lengthened, both to give the recruit more time and experience in the environment of strict discipline and to provide training command personnel a greater opportunity to evaluate new recruits and to orient them to their Navy careers, particularly to the realities of shipboard life.

6. Both at the recruiting and recruit training levels there must be a greater effort to screen out agitators, troublemakers and those who otherwise fail to meet acceptable standards of performance.

7. The subcommittee recommends that newly-received seamen aboard naval vessels be placed under the direct control and supervision of an experienced line officer and that experienced and trained leaders be assigned as their petty officer supervisors. Great care must be taken to ensure that these supervisory personnel are of the highest caliber.

8. If a serviceman performs his assigned duties adequately, he should be retained in service, if he so desires, regardless of his promotion potential, provided there is work for which he is qualified and willing to perform.

9. The subcommittee recommends the establishment of a separate rating for master-at-arms personnel with duties ashore and afloat to include those presently assigned to MAA and shore patrol personnel and those functions performed in the other services by military and security police.

10. The subcommittee received a copy of a report dated October 21, 1971, which was promulgated by the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to his subordinate commands. The report identifies commons circumstances, omissions, mistakes, over- and under-reactions, etc., as observed in several incidents of racial turbulence.

The subcommittee believes that much can be learned from a detailed study of that report and recommends that it be disseminated to all major unit commanders in the Navy.

11. The subcommittee recommends that personal counselling forms, warnings, report "chits" and commendations should be made a part of a man's personnel record. All derogatory material should be removed from that record only upon his transfer or discharge.

12. The Navy should consider the reestablishment of a program to provide quarterly marks for personnel in pay grades E-3 and below in place of the current semiannual reporting periods.

13. Every effort should be made to utilize automated devices aboard ship and contract personnel ashore to improve the day-to-day conditions and overall habitability for the ship's company.

14. While the subcommittee could recommend that the power to grant all administrative discharges be transferred to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, we feel a wiser course would be the transfer to unit commanders of all decisionmaking authority concerning administrative discharges which result in no loss of VA benefits. This would strengthen the commanding officer's authority.

However, in so doing, we recognize that every person who might receive such a discharge has the right to appeal his case to the Bureau of Naval Personnel and this right must be fully explained to the individual.

15. The subcommittee recommends that further attention be given to an in-depth examination of what appear to be acts of deliberate sabotage in the Navy.

16. The subcommittee recommends that the House Armed Services Committee examine the other services to evaluate any potential for incidents similar to the ones we investigated.