Black Supremacism in Uniform

Part I: “Remember the Kitty Hawk! Remember the Constellation! West Point’s Female Black Supremacists are Continuing a Grand U.S. Military Civil Rights Tradition!
“Mutiny! Two Racist Mutinies the U.S. Navy Has “Disappeared,” and the Shadow Navy Command Structure”;

Part II: “The Congressional Report on the Racist, Black Mutinies in 1972 aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation: Findings”;

Part III: “The Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation: Opinions of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee”;

Part IV: “Mutiny! Recommendations: Opinions of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee on the Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation”;

Part V: “The Mutiny on the Kitty Hawk: ‘Kill the son-of-a-bitch! Kill the white trash! Kill, kill, kill!’ The Report of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee on the Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation”;

Part VI: “The Mutiny on the Constellation”;

Part VII: “Permissiveness and Appeasement”;

Part VIII: “When the U.S. Navy Blinked”;

Part IX: “A Navy of Saboteurs”;

Part XI: “ The Shadow Navy: White Surrender, and the Black Supremacist Takeover”; and

Part XII: “Integrating Unfit Racists into This Man's Navy.”


Part X of the Report of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee on the Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies Aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation
Re-posted by Nicholas Stix

D. PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION

One of the most complex problems in the Navy is dealing with what an individual believes to be a fact rather than with the fact itself. It is equally as essential to correct a perception of wrong as it is to provide equal treatment to all.

While the members of the subcommittee were unable to find institutional discrimination, many young blacks, particularly those in the 18- to 22-year-old range who have been in the Navy for less than a year, perceive that there is a racial discrimination in the Navy.

Because of the black unity movement, they find it difficult to accept punishment on an individual basis. Rather, they perceive that punishment to one is punishment to all.

[“The black unity movement” = the black power movement.]

This, coupled with a view that every crime there must be fixed punishment prescribed, causes them perceive they have been unfairly treated at Captain's Mast (nonjudicial proceedings). Unlike more experienced sailors, blacks and whites, they would prefer not to have performance and prior offense records taken into consideration when punishment is given. This reflects a distrust for both the civil and military justice systems. They feel that the entire justice system in the United States has been weighted against blacks in a low-income status. Even though Captain's Mast provides an opportunity to provide justice tempered with mercy, the young black perceives that two different punishments for the same offense means, in itself, an abuse of authority and thus prejudice, especially if one of their members receives the greater punishment.

The young black also perceives that performance ratings given to blacks are discriminatory-although little evidence was given to substantiate this allegation. The semiannual performance evaluation considers not only job performance but also the sailor's appearance, military behavior, adaptability and potential for leadership. Obviously, these are judgmental considerations. It is apparent that senior petty officers and junior officers failed in their responsibility to counsel with their men by not pointing out the areas in which they were deficient so that when a man learned of his poor performance marks at the time an administrative discharge was given him, he perceived that it was given only because of his color. To the members of the subcommittee this perception, misplaced though it may be, indicates a failure in leadership and a failure in communication but it does not, in itself, have any connotation of racial prejudice.

There were complaints that work assignments were discriminatory. The subcommittee could find no evidence that any assignments were given to blacks that were also not given to white seamen of the same grade, mental category and time in service. Obviously, those who have had service-school training have a head start for advancement over those who do not have that training. Personnel in mental category IV and the lower half of category III are not sent to service schools. But this does not prevent any individual, utilizing his own initiative and personal efforts, from competing for higher rates. Many of the senior petty officers in the Navy today have used this route. It appears to the young black, since the majority of his petty officers and officers are white and since his initial job aboard a ship has been mess cooking or paint chipping, that his opportunities are limited. That this is racial discrimination is a false perception of the situation.

But the perception problem is not limited to black seamen alone. The Chief of Naval Operations does not admit to any severe breakdown of discipline in today's Navy. He asserts that the Navy is operating under the most arduous conditions in its history and has proved itself to be combat effective. In his view, combat effectiveness is the proof of the Navy's maintenance of good order and discipline.

He feels, however, that there has been less than a full measure of success in assuring equal opportunity in the Navy and in fostering a successful program of race relations. Therefore, he has placed primary emphasis on a program to resolve racial problems. Because of this emphasis on racial problems, his subordinates may have perceived his attitude and his directives in a manner that has caused a lessening of discipline, creating a situation wherein racial problems have been overemphasized.

[In other words, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was an incompetent weakling.]

As an example, we cite the handling of Constellation personnel who engaged in mutiny [!] or a "sit down strike". The primary officer from the staff of the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific, assigned to work with this group was one whose field was human relations and equal opportunity programs. His attitude and approach toward the dissidents was one of negotiation rather than discipline, with his major objective being the voluntary return of the dissidents to the ship. He held meetings to let the young blacks air their grievances. He called in personnel from the Human Relations Development Center to counsel the dissidents. He held meetings with their spokesmen and so-called "representatives" who alleged they were qualified to speak for the entire group. He urged the recall of Constellation so that the captain could personally negotiate with the group. He acted as a mediator for the group with the ship's captain, taking with him a list of three demands and urging their acceptance-which he subsequently obtained. These demands were the establishment of a board, external to the ship to (1) review all nonjudicial punishments given aboard the ship, (2) review all administrative discharges given to black personnel and, (3) amnesty for all personnel for their involvement in their "sitdown strike". The ship's captain made it known that he did not want certain of the group returned to his ship but the Commander, Naval Forces, Pacific and those in even higher headquarters made it perfectly clear that the men were to be offered the opportunity to return to the ship. Each dissident was given that opportunity. As events turned out, only five or six of the approximately 130 returned to the ship. Those who refused were charged only with an unauthorized absence of 6 hours and were given $25 fines.

From the incident alone, it appears obvious that the maintenance of discipline was secondary to satisfying demands of the young black personnel.

[The racist thugs were put in charge.]

But of equal interest is the perception of the captain who yielded to the demands of the dissidents upon the persuasion of the staff of his immediate superior. He testified that it was his belief that the primary objective of the Navy in this case was to return the dissident personnel to his ship, that he perceived the higher staff personnel accepted as fact the claims and grievances of the dissidents and that the staff had the preconceived notion that these blacks had actually been mistreated. He further believed that it was desired that his efforts be oriented toward maintaining the credibility of the human relations staff personnel who were negotiating.

The record is replete with testimony that middle management, the junior officers and senior petty officers, perceived their authority to have been diluted by the Chief of Naval Operations when he addressed all naval personnel in a series of Z-grams which, being general in nature, permitted individual interpretation of his directions.

It should be clearly understood that many of these perceptions are clearly contrary to the facts and do not necessarily represent the thinking of the major portion of the Navy. Nevertheless, as long as individuals perceive these to be facts, the Navy will continue to have problems in maintaining good order and discipline.