The Shadow Navy: White Surrender, and the Black Supremacist Takeover

Part I: “Remember the Kitty Hawk! Remember the Constellation! West Point’s Female Black Supremacists are Continuing a Grand U.S. Military Civil Rights Tradition!
“Mutiny! Two Racist Mutinies the U.S. Navy Has “Disappeared,” and the Shadow Navy Command Structure”;

Part II: “The Congressional Report on the Racist, Black Mutinies in 1972 aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation: Findings”;

Part III: “The Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation: Opinions of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee”;

Part IV: “Mutiny! Recommendations: Opinions of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee on the Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation”;

Part V: “The Mutiny on the Kitty Hawk: ‘Kill the son-of-a-bitch! Kill the white trash! Kill, kill, kill!’ The Report of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee on the Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation”;

Part VI: “The Mutiny on the Constellation”;

Part VII: “Permissiveness and Appeasement”;

Part VIII: “When the U.S. Navy Blinked”;

Part IX: “A Navy of Saboteurs”;

Part X: “Black Supremacism in Uniform”; and

Part XII: “Integrating Unfit Racists into This Man's Navy.”



Part XI of the Report of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee on the Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies Aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation
Re-posted by Nicholas Stix


E. THE FAILURE OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

One of the most alarming features of the investigation was the discovery of lack of leadership by middle management in the Navy.

It became apparent that while junior officers, chief petty officers and senior petty officers were performing their technical duties in a proficient manner, there was a lack of leadership in dealing with the seamen.

Examples of this lack of leadership are numerous: the poor personal grooming of the crew, the poor standards of cleanliness on at least one of the ships, the failure to counsel with subordinates concerning their "quarterly marks" or personal problems, the failure to take corrective action when corrective action was warranted, and the failure to demand an immediate response to lawful orders.

Undoubtedly, one of the primary factors is that as the Navy becomes more technical, grade or rank is obtained on the basis of technical skills rather than on leadership ability. There are insufficient on-going formal programs within the Navy to provide adequate training for petty officers, chief petty officers, and junior officers with respect to the basic elements of leadership.

One black chief petty officer described the change in discipline and the attitude toward discipline, as "just one gigantic cop-out by people like us. When the CNO sends a direct message to everybody in the field, the senior petty officer community and the middle management officer community have thrown up their hands and said, 'He has taken all our power away and we can't do anything.'"

Obviously, there has not been any removal of the tools to maintain discipline aboard a ship or anywhere else in the Navy, but the attitude toward the use of such tools has changed.

The change, in part, has been occasioned by the use of minority affairs representatives, human relations councils and human resources staffs which too frequently bypass the chain of command.

When a seamen can go to some "special interest group" outside the chain of command to discuss his specific grievance without first attempting to resolve his problem through his immediate superior, and, in turn, when someone on that council or committee attempts to mediate that problem with the seaman's supervisor, then the authority of that supervisor is inevitably diluted. The result is that, too often, the supervisor later gives in to an unwarranted request or fails to take corrective action rather than fighting the auxiliary chain of command.

Also, because of a general feeling of permissiveness that we found prevailed among many personnel in the Navy, there is a tendency on the part of many junior officers, chief petty officers, and senior petty officers to take the attitude of "don't make waves." A good example of this was given the members of the subcommittee wherein a chief was preventing some men from going on liberty because of dirty shoes and unkempt appearance. A lieutenant told the chief to let them go on liberty and not rock the boat. This attitude breeds contempt by the seamen for their superiors and sows seeds for the destruction of the system.

We cannot and must not permit the middle management team to adopt a passive attitude which lets the men do anything they want to do. Superiors in the Navy are supposed to command, not give in to demands. Otherwise, there is no authority.