Part III: The Racist, 1972 Black Mutinies Aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation: Opinions of the Investigative, Congressional Sub-Committee

 

[Previously: Part I: “Remember the Kitty Hawk! Remember the Constellation! West Point’s Female Black Supremacists are Continuing a Grand U.S. Military Civil Rights Tradition! Mutiny! Two Racist Mutinies the U.S. Navy Has “Disappeared,” and the Shadow Navy Command Structure”; and

[Part II: “The Congressional Report on the Racist, Black Mutinies in 1972 Aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and the U.S.S. Constellation: Findings”]
 

Re-posted by Nicholas Stix
 

B. OPINIONS

1. The subcommittee is of the position that the riot on Kitty Hawk consisted of unprovoked assaults by a very few men, most of whom were below-average mental capacity, most of whom had been aboard for less than one year, and all of whom were black. This group, as a whole, acted as "thugs" which raises doubt as to whether they should ever have been accepted into military service in the first place.

2. The subcommittee expresses its strong objection to the procedures utilized by higher authority to negotiate with Constellation's dissidents and, eventually, to appease them by acquiescing to their demands and by meting out minor nonjudicial punishment for what was a major affront to good order and discipline. Moreover, the subcommittee stresses that the actions committed aboard that ship have the potential for crippling a combatant vessel in a war zone.

3. The subcommittee believes that advice concerning decisions which had to be made with regard to Constellation, offered by personnel in human relations billets to line officers, was uniformly poor. The decisions, made on the basis of that advice, proved unsuccessful in bringing the incident to a conclusion.

Later decisions, reflecting reversal of the policy of negotiation with the dissident sailors, resulted in the transfer of the men off the ship in a disciplinary status.

4. The statement that riots, mutinies and acts of sabotage in the Navy are a product of "the time" is not valid. If those in positions of authority who profess such arguments really believe them, they have been negligent in not taking proper precautionary action to prevent to occurrence or to deal with such once they did occur. It is incredible that the Navy was totally unprepared to cope with such incidents as occurred aboard Kitty Hawk and Constellation. In view of the disturbances in recent years in the other military services, the Navy appears to have indulged in wishful thinking, apparently believing that the similar incidents would not happen aboard ship.

5. The members of the subcommittee fully support the idea of equality of opportunity in the military and naval forces of the United States for all persons. Since there may well be individual attitudes of discrimination among some persons serving in those forces--discrimination directed toward blacks or whites, or any other ethnic or racial groups--human relation programs remain essential.

6. Where Human Relation Councils and Minority Affairs offices are manned solely by minority personnel, they become conduits for minority personnel to bypass the normal chain of command. Used properly, as another set of eyes and ears to keep the commander informed as to personnel problems, they can be worthwhile; but used as vehicle for the settlement of individual minority grievances which should be resolved within the command structure, they are divisive and disruptive of good order and discipline and encourage further polarization. The equal opportunity and human relations programs of the Navy must not, in any way, dilute the authority of the chain of command.

7. The subcommittee detects a failure in the middle management area in that there has been a reluctance to utilize the command authority inherent in those positions.

8. The Navy's recruiting advertising appears to promise more than the Navy is able to deliver, especially to personnel who are unable to qualify for "A" school training. This can create frustration and discontent. The hopes held out by this advertising, plus statements made by some Navy recruiters, present an unrealistic picture of the Navy. Any such distortions should be corrected.

9. Once a new seaman reports to a division, there [sic] too little individual contact between him and his immediate supervisors, the petty officers and junior officers assigned to that division. Too frequently the seaman is counselled [sic] regarding his performance ratings, even if they are low. There is also a failure to effectively explain to him any opportunities he has for advancement and the steps he should take to achieve promotions. As a result, the young seaman sometimes becomes frustrated concerning his future as he performs unskilled laborer's jobs on a continuing basis.

10. The Navy provides authority to a commanding officer to give a general discharge (under honorable conditions) to those who have a GCT test score of 41 or less, have no more than a tenth grade education, have had low performance marks (including: professional performance, military behavior, military appearance and adaptability), and who have been in the Navy at least one year. All other administrative discharges are decided at the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

The subcommittee believes that having accepted a man into the Navy knowing his low test scores and educational background, the Navy should apply the same procedures to a determination of his discharge as apply to all others.

11. The subcommittee commends the Chief of Naval Operations for those of his programs which are designed to improve Navy life and yet maintained good order and discipline through the traditional channels of authority.