How Profiling Saved My Life: Reflections on Black Supremacy and Crime

By Nicholas Stix
December 14, 2003
A Different Drummer/Toogood Reports

Gettin' Paid
 

It was just after 9 p.m. on a school night, and Dennis, Steve, Michael, maybe another guy and myself were on the corner, by the parking garage of a fancy apartment building a block away from our slummy neighborhood. Dennis, the ringleader was 14, Steve was 15, I was 13 and Michael was 12.

Along comes an unmarked car, and Det. Kevan and some other plainclothes guys jump out, and hassle us. Stupid Det. Kevan, the jerk. Father of Jimmy, the bully, who was my age, and Jimmy's oldest brother, who was an even crazier bully. (The two middle brothers were regular guys. I used to hang out with them, during my occasional visits to high school, before dropping out. They had nothing to do with Jimmy.) If Det. Kevan lived down South, you'd call him a redneck. Mean, stupid, and obnoxious.

Det. Kevan and his associates sent us on our way.

It never occurred to us to sue the Long Beach Police Department for abuse of authority and profiling. Maybe that was because when Kevan & Co. jumped out of their cars, we were just about to commit a felony or three, breaking into cars in that parking lot. Maybe because we hadn't been taught to scream bloody murder, when we got caught doing wrong. Maybe because we were white.

And what if Kevan & Co. had left us alone? We would have broken into cars, and stolen stereos and such, as planned, sold our booty for a couple of dollars, and eventually shifted about to steal bigger and more expensive objects -- like entire cars. Between the law of averages and our natural stupidity, we all would have ended up arrested multiple times.

And Dennis did, in fact, end up in the Berkshire School for Boys, a reform school in upstate New York, for an early experiment in multiculturalism. He went on a mugging spree one night with two slightly older sociopaths -- a Jew named David Kaiser and a black drug addict named Tyrone Huffman. (One night, for no particular reason, Tyrone decided to stomp me to death, but was interrupted by a righteous, black Christian woman whom I remember only as "Darnell's mother.")

I know that Mike spent some time in Nassau County Jail as a teenager, because he bragged about it ("Nassau County's eggs suck!"). And since Steve was unable or unwilling to go to school, show up even for a security guard job, stay off the booze or hold his booze, I'm going to presume that he spent at least some time inside. (I didn't hang around to find out.)

Eventually, I realized that I was unable to stay cool enough to avoid getting caught when the police were chasing me, no talent for the violence that is inevitable even in a con man's life, and didn't want to get raped. And so, I changed my ways. Otherwise, I doubt I would still be alive.

That was 1971, this is now.

Now, when a group of teenage boys hangs out on the street at night, they think they have a right to be left alone by the police. At least they do, if they are black or Hispanic. And where do they get such notions? And why are they routinely out on the street—not at 9 p.m., but at 10, 11, midnight and later—on school nights?
 

These reflections were inspired by the New York City government’s recent
settlement of a lawsuit, in which it agreed to pay a total of $167,500 to ten plaintiffs who alleged they had been targeted by police, merely because they were black.

The lawsuit claimed that the NYPD's Street Crimes Unit, which during the mid-to-late 1990s cleared thousands of illegal guns off the street, engaged in racial profiling in its "stop-and-frisk" policies. As part of the settlement, which was finalized late last month, the NYPD has agreed to keep records with racial and ethnic breakdowns of every stop and frisk. The NYPD defended itself by pointing out that 50.9% of its stop-and-frisks were of blacks, a percentage that was lower than the 59% proportion of black suspects identified by victims of violent crimes.

According to the Associated Press, Bill Goodman, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, said "in practical terms the deal mean [sic] that officers will no longer break up groups of kids on a corner merely because of their race."

Goodman was being cute. What he really meant, was that officers will no longer be able to break up groups of black or Hispanic kids hanging out on the street at night. Officers will, however, be able to harass white kids, which black officers have been known to do for years. That should help stem the rising tide of white lawlessness... and be the death of countless thousands of black boys.

(A frail-looking, short, white former editor of mine who grew up in Brooklyn likes to tell of the two huge, black policewomen who stopped him on his way home from school one afternoon during the 1980s, threatening to arrest him for lack of personal identification. No one is legally obliged to carry personal identification in New York City, and police can only detain someone for lack of ID, if he has already been caught committing a misdemeanor. [Postscript, May 2014: The law has since been changed, such that police can arrest someone for lack of ID, though this law is clearly not enforced, where illegal aliens are concerned.])

But that's not the worst of it. The suit was initiated in 1999 by the Center for Constitutional Rights, it led to the NYPD eliminating the Street Crimes Unit, and the settlement gives the Center control of the records that the NYPD compiles on stops. An officer must now justify, as if he were on the witness stand, every stop-and-frisk he undertakes of a black or Hispanic. (He can stop and frisk whites all he likes.) And if the CCR doesn't like the NYPD's numbers, it can wreak continuing havoc with law enforcement in New York City. And if the NYPD does its job, the CCR is guaranteed not to like what it sees. So, in order to avoid trouble from the CCR, the NYPD will merely intensify its de-policing practices regarding blacks and Hispanics. Which is what the CCR wanted, all along.

Based on its previous arguments, I expect the CCR to demand that the NYPD devote at most 24.5% of its stops to blacks, since that is the black percentage of the population. In order to play it safe, the NYPD will probably stop many fewer blacks than that, and compensate for the low black proportion of stops by terrorizing white and Asian men who match no victim's description of a criminal. Never mind that at least 60% (officially, 59%) of the perpetrators of violent crimes in New York are described as having been black. (Note that leftists have for approximately 40 years claimed that white police cannot distinguish between blacks, and simply stop "any black male." That claim goes under the category of "big lies.")

In case you've never heard of the CCR, it is a non-profit law firm that never met a foreign terrorist, illegal alien, or minority criminal it didn't like. It wants there to be as many armed, minority criminals as possible on New York's streets for, like black supremacists, though for different ideological reasons, the CCR's communist lawyers see street criminals as a revolutionary army. The organization is also committed to undermining U.S. immigration law and the War on Terror, and inventing "civil rights" for people who don't properly have any, such as foreign terrorists and illegal aliens, while disenfranchising law-abiding, American citizens, especially white ones. The CCR seeks to turn the American legal system on its head, and is so far doing quite well, thank you.

The Racial Profiling Hoax
 

When Rudolph Giuliani was New York's mayor (1994-2001), racist black leaders and journalists, aided by their white allies, fabricated the racial profiling hoax. The hoax received its current name in 1999, but is actually close to 40 years old. During the 1960s, Marxists insisted that policemen constituted an "occupying army" in urban black slums. Had anyone challenged the Marxists' illogic, he could have pointed out that if blacks truly were a foreign nation, they would not be entitled to welfare payments, free medical treatment, schools, or any other American public services. (In those days, it was still understood that American public services were reserved for Americans.)

The history of Giuliani's tenure was rewritten on the fly, the real history replaced by a fictional one, in which a racist, thuggish mayor who used the police to terrorize black men and boys, was being heroically stood up to by the black community.

The real story was that black New Yorkers were outraged that a white man had defeated the city's first black mayor, socialist David N. Dinkins (elected in 1989 in the closest election in the city's history, in which thousands of dead Democrats were on the voter rolls). Many local blacks were sure that New York would now forever be a "black" city, with black mayors, police chiefs, etc. That Dinkins was a corrupt, racist, incompetent did not bother the majority of black New Yorkers in the least, although black supremacists were visibly upset that he wasn't corrupt, racist, or incompetent enough for their liking. One of Al Sharpton's accomplices in the Tawana Brawley hoax complained that Dinkins was "wearing too many yarmulkes" (read: friendly to Jews).

In late 1993, before Giuliani was even inaugurated mayor, Al Sharpton declared that he would make it impossible for Giuliani to govern. Sharpton should have been arrested for making terroristic threats, but you know those New York judges.

(And not just New York judges. In 1998, when black supremacist leader Khalid Muhammad came to town for his first "Million Youth March," promising to incite a race riot, and Giuliani sought to shut down the march, federal Judge Lewis Kaplan turned incitement to riot, into a First Amendment right. Perhaps Judge Kaplan thought it was spelled, "First Amendment riot.")

Black leaders invited the mayor-elect to their annual leadership dinner, only to revoke the invitation, without any provocation from Giuliani. The monsters wanted to publicly humiliate a white man. Not only was the revocation of the invitation clearly planned, but black leaders repeated the stunt one year later!

Instead of doing their job, the local and national media (both of which are situated in Manhattan), not only refused to report on the racist campaign against Giuliani, but became active co-conspirators in it.

Giuliani had not yet enacted any policies. The attacks on him were the expression of nothing more than an all-consuming, black racism. I have been highly critical of many of Mayor Giuliani's policies, but I am in awe of the personal strength he showed, in facing down the organized, concentrated hatred of not only almost two million racist, black New Yorkers, but the demagoguery of the local and national media. Who among those reading these words could have withstood such a daily onslaught of hatred, lies, and invective without physically or emotionally breaking down, dropping dead, or even committing suicide? And yet, Giuliani not only prevailed, but re-made New York's image around the world -- years before his celebrated leadership following 911 -- and in 1997, handily won re-election in a city where registered Democrats outnumbered Republicans five-to-one.

It is hard to exaggerate the outrageous character of the racial profiling hoax. As liberal, black, Harvard Law professor Randall Kennedy observes in his landmark, 1997 book, Race, Crime, and the Law, "Blacks have suffered more from being left unprotected or underprotected by law enforcement authorities than from being mistreated as suspects or defendants, although it is allegations of the latter that now typically receive the most attention."

Nation-Building

You may well be asking, why I am devoting so much of an essay on racial profiling to Giuliani. That is because the 1999 racial profiling hoax was initially engineered as a campaign in the politics of personal destruction, aimed at one white man. But it was also yet another expression of black supremacy's race war against white Americans in general, and white New Yorkers in particular. (In addition, it was part of the Democrat Party's strategy to get Hillary Clinton elected U.S. senator from New York.) Giuliani was convenient, because he gave black supremacists like Al Sharpton, Sonny Carson, and the Rev. Herbert Daughtry a flesh-and-blood "Goldstein," the mythical character in George Orwell's 1984, who is used to focus the people's hatred.

Other black supremacist campaigns have included the 1987-88 Tawana Brawley Hoax, 1996 Texaco Hoax, 1996-97 ebonics scam, 2000 Florida Disenfranchisement Hoax, reparations scam, etc. The common themes of the campaigns are the notions that no black must ever defer to any white authority figure (whether we are speaking of a white teacher, police officer, or employer); that every white must defer to all blacks, including white men deferring to black children; that whites must give or pay blacks whatever the latter demand, whenever they demand it; that laws that apply to whites may not apply to blacks; that blacks have a veto right over any election results they dislike; that blacks may violate the persons of whites at will; in short, that whites must be the de facto (and increasingly, de jure) slaves of blacks, who have the power of life or death over their white chattel.

Black supremacists are in the nation-building business, and every nation requires an army. In every young black man that a black supremacist helps on the road to becoming a hardened criminal, the supremacist gets a boost of self-esteem, as he fantasizes about the young man's white victims, and counts the young man as a new recruit to the black revolutionary army.

As John Henry Wright, a member of a small black gang I briefly ran with, circa 1972, once told me, "All the white people gon' die." Even me? "Even you, Stix."

I left that gang when John Henry and the gang's leader, Alan "Pancho" Hankins, took to telling me, "Stix, you our slave," and having me do all the shoplifting (such as a 20-lb. turkey before Thanksgiving), while they took all the proceeds.

From 1974-1976, I was a token white in a federally-funded, black youth program for juvenile delinquents, the Youth Justice Program (YJP). In 1975, the program was taken over by black supremacists who gave us Sam Greenlee's novel, The Spook Who Sat by the Door, to read. Spook is a James-Bond-in-blackface fantasy of a bloody, racial revolution, which the middle-and upper-middle-class youth workers insisted presents a rational plan for action. In Spook, the nation's first black CIA operative organizes black street gangs across the country. I guess my YJP buddies were supposed to die for the likes of the spoiled, Harvard psych major extolling the book's virtues.

But the notion of turning black street criminals into an army of racial genocide was already by then a time-honored, black supremacist tradition. It went back at least to the Moorish Science Temple, founded in Newark in 1913 by "Noble Drew Ali" (Timothy Drew; 1866-1916); and was refined in New York by Marcus M. Garvey (1887-1940), the founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and "Back-to-Africa" movement; and in Detroit and Chicago by Elijah Muhammad (Elijah Poole; 1897-1975), the leader of the Black Muslims, which is now known as the Nation of Islam. The aforementioned men were genocidal cutthroats all.

Pick a Number, Any Number
 

Since blacks were being stopped and frisked, and arrested in numbers much higher than their percentage of the population, the story went, such police behavior was "proof" of the NYPD's racism. In spring, 1999, every racist, socialist, or communist celebrity in town got himself arrested during a daily civil disobedience show in front of Police Headquarters, which as New York Post columnist Bob McManus argued, was clearly being jointly organized by the national, state, and local Democrat Party apparatuses.

At the time, Ted Koppel devoted at least one episode of his dramatic series, Nightline, to a hit piece by Kevin "I'm-not-a-reporter-I-just- play-one" Newman, attacking Mayor Giuliani. But Koppell's racial intimidation tactics were no match for Giuliani, who, bless him, went on the offensive with Koppell, pointing out that the proportions of blacks stopped or arrested matched the proportion of crime suspects identified by victims as black. [P.S. 2014: Actually, the proportion of blacks stopped or arrested was too low. While 59 percent of criminals were identified as black, only 50.9 percent of the suspects stopped or arrested were black.]

The race hoaxers and affirmative action pushers (if you'll pardon the redundancy) have always played a shell game with numbers, constantly switching their frame of reference. When it's a matter of the arrests or stops of blacks, the hoaxers use the black proportion of the population, rather than the black proportion of criminal suspects as their base. When it's the number of blacks in a certain job, again the hoaxers use the proportion of blacks in the population as their base, rather than the percentage of people with the requisite qualifications. (E.g., while blacks comprise 12.5% of the general population, in academia, they hold only 3% of all Ph.D.s.) But when blacks are wildly overrepresented in a field, as they are in entertainment, and especially, in professional sports, the hoaxers avoid that issue. They complain instead about the lack of black coaches or managers, and instead of using the percentage of blacks in the general population, or the percentage of blacks seeking such jobs, they switch to the percentage of black players.

Such numbers games would never succeed, if white folks in high places weren't such cowards, and simply called every racist, black hustler's bluff.

In my story, I emphasized Det. Kevan's stupidity, not because he was incompetent, but because he was competent, in spite of not being the brightest light. Police work isn't rocket science. Kevan was a veteran cop, but you don't have to be a veteran with a badge to know that a group of adolescent boys hanging out on the street at 9 p.m. on a school night, is a crime waiting to happen.

Why? Because if they had proper adult supervision, they would be home by then. Because there was no legitimate pastime they could have engaged in. Because boys that age, if they have any gumption, are incurably stupid, and prone to acts of often suicidal bravado, especially if they are together in a group, where they will seek to impress each other.

The funny thing is, the lawsuit was a case of kicking a dead horse. For years, New York police have avoided breaking up groups of black boys or men hanging out on the street at night. Too much trouble. The cops might find themselves the targets of a race riot; of complaints on the next day's news by the local, racist, black preacher, and the local, racist, black elected official; a local, racist, black journalist; the head of the local, black non-profit; and the local, racist, black talk radio host; not to mention their elite, white allies. The punks will predictably be presented by the aforementioned, cookie-cutter racists and elites as victims of out-of-control, racist, white authority.

(Of course, the purpose of the lawsuit was also to shake down whites for money, at which it was moderately successful. Thus did it represent a new chapter both in the history of black race hoaxes and black racial extortion. The plaintiffs were "professional blacks," in the phrase used by Jim Sleeper in his 1990 book, The Closest of Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics of Race in New York. "Professional blacks" expect to be paid simply for being black.)

And so, instead of breathing a sigh of relief at a close call, the punks in question will feel emboldened to go a step further next time. Eventually, they will go too far too many times, and land in prison.

To be continued in the next column:

How Profiling Saved My Life, Part II