Monday, March 04, 2013

When Emasculated* Republicans Deign to “Respond” to Totalitarian, Racist Black Morons, Nothing Good Can Happen: Ta-Nehisi Coates, Megan McArdle, and So-Called “White Flight”

By Nicholas Stix

Racist, totalitarian, black moron Ta-Nehisi Coates is promoting the current fictional academic theory “explaining” so-called white flight. Surprise, surprise.

One could ignore Coates, or one could refute him with reality, but this is totalitarian white civil rights Republican Megan McArdle, the glibertarian formerly known as “Jane Galt.” So, instead she says, ‘I’ll meet your unreality, and raise it.’

The first reason why whites left urban neighborhoods was human nature. What sane person who could get out of a crowded urban neighborhood of apartment buildings, for a house, yard, and backyard in the suburbs would stay in the city? Although lefties promoted the fiction that suburban life was “sterile,” sane people knew that it was the greatest institution ever invented for the raising of children.

The second reason was the white parents’ decency and devotion. Those working and middle-class white liberals who still clung bitterly to urban life quickly learned that for blacks, “integration” meant black kids turning their beloved children into punching bags, piggy banks, and rape toys, while the police and school authorities turned a blind eye. (During the 1970s, Thurgood Marshall privately bragged to his Supreme Court colleague, William O. Douglas, that the whole point of Brown v. Board of Education was racial conquest.) Any white parent who did not flee integration, at the cost of everything he had worked a lifetime to build up, was guilty of child neglect.

By the way, I didn’t bother trying to post this remark at The Atlantic, because Coates has blocked me so completely at his blog that not even my votes count. (Though there's no explicit indication of that; rather, my votes initially appear to be tabulated, before disappearing.) That’s why you see a Communist-style echo chamber there of a continuous standing ovation for Comrade Coates, that affirmative action genius.

(I sought to post this comment, in two parts at McArdle’s blog. It’s pending. I don’t know if she’ll permit it, and I’m certainly not waiting around to find out. I learned that lesson the hard way at many other blogs, and not just liberal ones.)
I learned about this Bizarro World “dialogue” from the brilliant and much more succinct Countenance Blog, but I am not sure if I should thank Countenance for directing me to McArdle (and thereby Coates), or sue him!

[*At least Megan McArdle has an excuse for being emasculated—she’s a woman!]

* * *

The Ghetto, Public

Policy, and the

Jewish Exception

By Ta-Nehisi Coates
February 28, 2013
The Atlantic

The other day I wrote about differences in how two sectors of Chicago's white community responded to the prospect of integration. I contrasted the response of Chicago's upper-class whites with its working class white ethnics. I am coming to hate all of these terms for their lack of precision. Chicago's white Jewish community demonstrates the problem. When I was researching my article on Detroit, African Americans generally told me that it was usually in the Jewish communities where desegregation began. Jews proved much more open to renting or selling to black families than other whites. I won't go so far as to say that there were no Jewish race riots in the mid-20th century, but I haven't read about a single one.

What's more, I don't know how much should be made about the fact that Jews, like other whites, ultimately left after large number of blacks moved in. It is increasingly clear to me that white flight was not a mystical process for which we have no real explanation or understanding. White flight was the policy of our federal, state, and local government. That policy held that Americans should enjoy easy access to the cities via the automobile and live in suburbs without black people, who by their very nature degraded property and humanity.

I wish I were exaggerating. From Beryl Satter's Family Properties:

In the 1930s, the U.S. appraisal industry opposed the "mixing" of the races, which it believed would cause "the decline of both the human race and of property values." Appraisers ensured segregation through their property rating system. They ranked properties, blocks, and even whole neighborhoods according to a descending scheme of A (green), B (blue), C (yellow), and D (red). A ratings went to properties located in "homogenous" areas -- ones that (in one appraiser's words) lacked even "a single foreigner or Negro." Properties located in neighborhoods containing Jewish residents were riskier; they were marked down to a B or C. If a neighborhood had black residents it was marked as D, or red, no matter what their social class or how small a percentage of the population they made up. These neighborhoods' properties were appraised as worthless or likely to decline in value. In short, D areas were "redlined," or marked as locations in which no loans should be made for either purchasing or upgrading properties.

The FHA embraced these biases. It collected detailed maps of the present and likely future location of African Americans, and used them to determine which neighborhoods would be denied mortgage insurance. Since banks and savings and loan institutions often relied upon FHA rating maps when deciding where to grant their mortgages, the FHA's appraisal policies meant that blacks were excluded by definition from most mortgage loans.

The FHA's Underwriting Manual also praised restrictive covenants as "the surest protection against undesirable encroachment" of "inharmonious racial groups." The FHA did not simply recommend the use of restrictive covenants but often insisted upon them as a condition for granting mortgage insurance....the FHA effectively standardized and nationalized the hostile but locally variable racial biases of the private housing industry.



In 1954, FHA official George W. Snowden told the Mortgage Bankers Association that since black home purchasers had an excellent credit record, it would be logical for mortgage bankers to use a "uniform, single-standard lending policy" for blacks and whites. The association's trade journal, Mortgage Banker, derided Snowden's comments as "one of the most remarkable statements ever heard from an MBA rostrum." In short, on the rare occasions that private bankers and savings and loan officials were presented with evidence of black creditworthiness, they rejected the information.
In Chicago, by the 1940s restrictive covenants covered "approximately half of the city's residential properties." There's nothing shadowy or overly complicated here. We do not need telepathy, nor do we need to look into the hearts of our government's officer to discern whether they were good people or not. It matters not whether the executors of these polices refrained from kicking the dog on the way out the door. The policies they proffered were patently racist. Their effects are unsurprising.

Satter's book is a mix of memoir and history chronicling the fleecing of Chicago's black community by the city's mortgage industry and her father's complicated efforts to fight that fleecing. Beryl Satter's father, Mark Satter, was Jewish. In his story and the stories of his neighbors in the Jewish enclave of Lawndale, we see two impulses born of oppression.

The first is genuinely sympathetic. Many of the Jews in Lawndale held fresh memories of their own discrimination, and could not fathom doing to blacks precisely what had been (and to some extent still was being) done to them:

Several of Lawndale's first black families were encouraged to seek housing there by Jewish friends. If viewed without prejudice, they had the makings of ideal neighbors. Most were Chicago-born middle-class men and women who purchased their buildings with substantial down payments. They managed to get modest mortgages to finance their purchases, and several paid off their mortgages early. The new black residents of Lawndale not only maintained their buildings but upgraded them.

The second impulse was darker:

...If many of Lawndale's residents were unsettled by the new arrivals from Mississippi, a small group of men saw something else in the faces of the hardworking new people now streaming into the area. They saw an opportunity.

Lawndale's operators, its schemers and hustlers, had much in common with the area's idealists. Like my father, several of them were first-or second-generation immigrant Jews. Their early years, like those of my father, were marked by anti-Semitism and poverty. But while my father's childhood disability and exposure to his father Isaac's social idealism inspired in him a profound empathy for the oppressed, these men drew very different conclusions from the harsh realities they had witnessed during the Depression. They had observed a world of victims and of victimizers, of those who "worked the system" and those who were destroyed by it. And they knew which side of that divide they wanted to be on.

In finding their way onto the proper side of the divide, Satter's operators hit upon the contract scheme: A speculator would purchase a home at a low price, and then offer it to a black family at a much steeper price. Except no deed would be transferred. The new black "buyer" would be responsible for monthly payments with high interest attached. Moreover, they would be responsible for any repairs and for all code violations. If one payment was missed the contractor would immediately move to evict, and the black "buyer" would forfeit not just their down-payment, but every payment they'd made since, and any money they'd put into upkeep. The speculator would then wash and repeat.

The scheme was dirty all the way through. Often the speculator would present himself to the family as a "broker" seeking the best deal on their behalf, concealing the fact that he was also the owner. He might steer the family to a lawyer who was in on the scheme, or a construction crew also in on the take.

An illustrative example:

In 1953, for example, Sallie Bottom and her daughter, Jessie Jackson, bought a two-flat apartment on contract for $28,000, with a hefty down payment of $6,000. Their broker, Frank Bishofberger, concealed the fact that he was the building's owner and that he had purchased it only a few weeks before, for $17,000. By 1959, Bottom and Jackson had paid Bishofberger an additional $16,800. At that point, despite having made a down payment of over one-third of the building's true value--plus additional monthly installments that more than covered what Bishofberger had paid for the building--the two women fell behind, and Bishofberger moved to evict them.

And subsequently "sell" the building again to another black family. Satter estimates that some 85 percent of all properties sold to blacks in Chicago was done on contract. And there was no shortage of black buyers. From Hirsch:

There is no doubt that many blacks were ready to take advantage of the new housing opportunities as they appeared. Both during and after the war, sustained economic gains permitted an increasing number of blacks to better their situation. Adjusting for inflation, an income of $5,000 in 1950 was roughly equivalent to earning $6,000 in 1960. In 1950, 10,200 (8.9%) of Chicago's nonwhite families earned $5,000 per year. Ten years later, 63,100 (34.1%) of the city's nonwhite families earned $6,000 or more.

By the mid-1950s, the National Housing Inventory found 45,000 black families in Chicago in the market for middle- or upper-income housing. The augmented financial resources of at least some blacks were crucial to the destabilization of old racial borders. The high degree of residential segregation in Chicago produced a dual housing market: one for whites, another for blacks.

The restricted black housing supply and the overwhelming demand for new homes combined to inflate the cost of black housing. Rents in black areas ranged from 15% to 50% higher than that paid by whites for similar accommodations, the Illinois Inter-Racial Commission wrote in 1944. The difference was especially great, they added, in areas just beginning the process of racial succession. By 1960, even after a decade of new construction, the rents paid by blacks were still 10% to 25% higher than those paid by whites for equivalent shelter. Not only were rents higher, but the cost of purchasing housing was greater for blacks.

In mid-20th century Chicago, black people were, like most Americans, enthralled with homeownership. But the federal government which helped whites achieve the dream, worked to hinder black achievement. In the private sector, slum clearance schemes were hatched to destroy entire neighborhoods with minimal attendance to new housing. The city's aldermen worked overtime to guarantee that this new housing be erected only in the already overcrowded ghettoes. Out in the streets mobs of whites, thousands deep, rioted at the mere hint of integration. The unlucky black family caught in the sights of such a mob enjoyed only whimsy police protection.

Taking all this in, it is hard to not conclude that in mid-20th century Chicago, black existed beyond the usual protections of the state. And so it was hunting season:

According to Favil Berns, the speculators saw their customers as "on their own. If you can survive in the wilderness, survive. If you can't, you go by the wayside, that's all. It is survival of the fittest." Selling on contract was closer toa blood sport than a livelihood. As Berns said, explaining why speculative contract sellers kept at the business despite having already made huge amounts of money, "It was like people who like to go out and shoot lions in Africa. It was the same the thrill...the thrill of the chase and the kill."

I am tempted to read something into this regarding the results of oppression, given that the speculators Satter is discussing are almost all Jewish, but I think that might be too far afield for me. And yet I think there is something instructive here, given that the Jewish reaction to integration is different. The race riots were not the result of few bad apples, but whole communities engaging in terrorism. Speculation and selling on contract is not a communal act, but the act of individuals. It's fair to say that the terrorists of Cicero--at times numbering some 4,000--represented a communal will. You can't really draw the same conclusion from the Jewish speculators. It's much easier to argue for "bad apples" in those cases.

And to argue for the great harm that the concept of whiteness has done to this country, because what you do find among the Jewish contractors is the same racism that you would see in Cicero. Satter reports one contractor asking a question of black people, that any bigot of Mississippi would have posed at the time, "How are young going to educate dumb animals?"




* * *

How Good Principles

Can Make Bad Rules

By Megan McArdle
February 28, 2013
The Daily Beast

How short-sighted FHA rules enforced housing segregation and inequality


My former colleague, Ta-Nehisi Coates, writes that white flight was, in essence, a government policy:

It is increasingly clear to me that white flight was not a mystical process for which we have no real explanation or understanding. White flight was the policy of our federal, state and local government. That policy held that Americans should enjoy easy access to the cities via the automobile live in suburbs without black people, who by their very nature degraded property and humanity.

I wish I were exaggerating. From Beryl Satter's Family Properties:

In the 1930s, the U.S. appraisal industry opposed the "mixing" of the races, which it believed would cause "the decline of both the human race and of property values." Appraisers ensured segregation through their property rating system. They ranked properties, blocks, and even whole neighborhoods according to a descending scheme of A (green), B (blue), C (yellow), and D (red). A ratings went to properties located in "homogenous" areas--ones that (in one appraiser's words) lacked even "a single foreigner or Negro." Properties located in neighborhoods containing Jewish residents were riskier; they were marked down to a B or C. If a neighborhood had black residents it was marked as D, or red, no matter what their social class or how small a percentage of the population they made up. These neighborhoods' properties were appraised as worthless or likely to decline in value. In short, D areas were "redlined," or marked as locations in which no loans should be made for either purchasing or upgrading properties.

The FHA embraced these biases. It collected detailed maps of the present and likely future location of African Americans, and used them to determine which neighborhoods would be denied mortgage insurance. Since banks and savings and loan institutions often relied upon FHA rating maps when deciding where to grant their mortgages, the FHA's appraisal policies meant that blacks were excluded by definition from most mortgage loans.

The FHA's Underwriting Manual also praised restrictive covenants as "the surest protection against undesirable encroachment" of "inharmonious racial groups." The FHA did not simply recommend the use of restrictive covenants but often insisted upon them as a condition for granting mortgage insurance....the FHA effectively standardized and nationalized the hostile but locally variable racial biases of the private housing industry.


Ta-Nehisi goes on to detail the ways in which American housing policy in the 1930s and 1940s actively encouraged racial segregation.  You should read the whole thing.

I would add one caution, however: we don't need to see this as deliberate policy. In fact, it might well be good policy gone terribly wrong when it collides with pervasive racism.

Homes in mostly black neighborhoods in the 1930s had a limited resale market among a group of people who were kept out of most of the better-paying jobs. Because the strength of the collateral is one of the best predictors of default, the FHA was probably right that lending into black neighborhoods was a relatively poor risk, even if the buyer had good credit. And that restrictive covenenants would protect the value of their collateral in white neighborhoods from the inevitable price decline that would follow if black people moved in--and most of the whites moved out.

The problem is that we don't want our government to treat the legacy of racism as a sort of natural hazard, similar to living on a flood plain. The racism that kept blacks out of good jobs and forbid them to live or eat where whites did was a terrible evil--and an evil that was, in substantial part, created and enforced by the power of the state.

We want our government to fight back against this sort of evil, not reinforce it.  As it clearly did reinforce it well into the 1950s, when the difficulty of getting mortgages trapped a lot of aspiring middle class homeowners in black neighborhoods into rip-off "rent to own" deals.  Decent, hard-working people were unable to get the same shot at the American dream as their white counterparts.

Why does this matter? Because it suggests more difficult arguments, and more difficult fixes. An FHA which is just refusing to lend into black neighborhoods because its staff doesn't like black people suggests some fairly simple fixes: change the rules, and replace any staffers who just don't want to lend money to members of other races. We are replacing a bad principle (black people shouldn't be allowed to live near white people) with a good one.

An FHA which is applying good principles ("be careful about collateral") to create substantively terrible rules with awful effects requires a different response.  You need to have a careful conversation about why this principle is being trumped by an even more powerful principle ("don't reinforce systemic racism")--and also, to set limits on the exception.  We don't want the FHA to stop worrying about collateral entirely.  We just want them to avoid writing rules that reinforce a segregated economic order.

The point is that racism is not just something that bad people do from bad motives.  It's a systemic issue--and if you ignore the systemic effects of your actions, you may end up perpetuating some terrible injustice.

1 comment:

  1. They seem to blame the government for letting people move out to the suburbs due to owning cars and being able to drive them on expressways to other, less diverse places. The government should have stopped people from moving where they wanted? In order to change residency people should have gotten permission first from Commissar Coates?
    Are there any black writers anywhere who have any capability of writing something that's not about discrimination studies? Apart from T Sowell and a few others most of them seem to make a living just essentially writing about themselves as if they're the most important subject in the world.

    ReplyDelete